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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) UTAH CODE ANNOT. Plaintiff/Appellant 
originally filed this appeal with the Utah Supreme Court, but that 
court transferred this matter to this Court on January 23, 1990, 
pursuant to Rule 4A(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
This is an appeal from an order of summary judgment and dismissal 
with prejudice which was granted by the Second District Court in 
favor of Defendant/Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, Defendant/Respondent John Deere Insurance Company herein 
sets forth its Statement of Issues Presented for Review. 
1. Is the Certificate of Insurance which STUART 
received a part of the writings constituting the entire insurance 
agreement between JOHN DEERE and STUART? 
2. Does STUART'S failure to move to strike the 
affidavits in support of JOHN DEERE'S summary judgment motion, 
combined with its failure to move for further discovery pursuant 
to Rule 56(f) Utah R. Civ. P. constitute a waiver of any formal or 
evidentiary defects contained in the affidavit of Deborah 
Kamenetzky? 
3. Is the insurance agreement unambiguous, such that 
this Court need not consider parol evidence? 
4. Did the lower court commit reversible error when it 
determined that insurance coverage under the Master Policy and the 
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Certificate of Insurance ended when STUART terminated the security-
agreement/ satisfied its debt, and got credit for the unearned 
premium? 
5. If the insurance agreement is ambiguous, did the 
lower court commit reversible error when it considered an 
affidavit containing parol evidence, which evidence is undisputed, 
and to which affidavit STUART neither objected nor moved to strike? 
6. Did § 31A-21-303 or § 70C-6-304 UTAH CODE ANNOT. 
require JOHN DEERE to give STUART notice that the insurance 
coverage ended upon STUART'S payoff of the insured property? 
7. Is STUART entitled to insurance coverage for which 
it did not pay? 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) UTAH CODE ANNOT. (1953 as amended) (Addendum B) 
§ 31A-21-303 UTAH CODE ANNOT. (1953 as amended) (Addendum C) 
§ 70C-6-304 UTAH CODE ANNOT. (1953 as amended) (Addendum D) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Proceedings Below 
Plaintiff/Appellant STUART, INC. ("STUART"), a Utah 
corporation which was involuntarily dissolved by the Utah State 
Department of Business Regulation on March 1, 1987 (R. 138) 
commenced this action by filing a complaint against 
Defendant/Respondent JOHN DEERE INSURANCE CO. ("JOHN DEERE") on 
August 1, 1988 (R. 1-13). 
The Complaint contained one cause of action. STUART 
complained of JOHN DEERE's alleged failure to abide by the terms 
of an insurance policy which STUART alleged was contained within a 
Retail Instalment Contract ("Contract") (R. 2). The Retail 
Instalment Contract covered STUART'S purchase of a John Deere 
backhoe from Scott Machinery Company in Salt Lake City, Utah (R.7). 
JOHN DEERE filed a motion for summary judgment on 
March 3, 1989 (R. 24-25). JOHN DEERE also filed a memorandum of 
points and authorities (R. 26-33) and initially, two affidavits in 
support of its motion, those of Terry Digman (R. 34-44) and Howard 
Payne (R. 45-56). On or about March 14, 1989, and at the request 
of STUART, JOHN DEERE consented to extend the time within which 
STUART could respond to JOHN DEERE's motion (R. 57). On April 17, 
1989 JOHN DEERE filed the Amended Affidavit of Howard Payne, which 
certified that the insurance policy attached to it was the policy 
in effect at the time STUART alleges it suffered its loss (R. 
63-92). 
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On May 16, 1989 (over 10 weeks after JOHN DEERE filed its 
motion), STUART filed its Statement of Points in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of 
Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 93-109). On 
June 15, 1989, JOHN DEERE filed its Reply Brief in Support of its 
motion for summary judgment and in opposition to STUART'S cross 
motion for summary judgment (R. 117-127). Attached to this Reply 
Brief were the Affidavit of Deborah M. Kamenetzky (R. 128-137) and 
a certified copy of the March 1, 1987 Certificate of Dissolution 
by which STUART was no longer recognized as a legal entity in Utah 
(R. 138). STUART's Reply Memorandum in support of its Cross 
Motion was filed on June 22, 1989 (R. 143-149). 
On August 10, 1989 JOHN DEERE filed a Supplemental 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 165-175). That memorandum included a copy of 
a very recent memorandum opinion made, after trial to a jury, by 
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas on 
June 19, 1989 ("Arkansas Decision"). STUART replied to the 
Arkansas Decision on August 17, 1989 (R. 176-180). Finally, on 
August 22, 1989 JOHN DEERE filed a motion for leave to set up 
counterclaim in the event its motion for summary judgment was 
denied (R. 181-183). 
After all supporting and opposing memoranda had been 
filed, the Second District Court heard oral argument on 
September 5, 1989. At the hearing on September 5, 1989, the lower 
court took the motions under advisement (R. 184). 
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On September 18, 1989, the lower court ruled on the 
pending motions for summary judgment. The lower court granted 
JOHN DEERE1s motion for summary judgment and denied STUART'S cross 
motion for summary judgment (R. 195-197). The lower court later 
ruled that JOHN DEERE*s motion for leave to set up counterclaim 
was moot (R. 202). 
At the lower court's direction, and pursuant to Rule 
4-504 UCJA, JOHN DEERE prepared and served its proposed Order of 
Summary Judgment and Dismissal of Complaint with Prejudice 
(-Order") to counsel for STUART on September 21, 1989 (R. 207). 
STUART made no objections to the form of the proposed order, and 
the lower court signed and entered the Order on October 4, 1989 
(R. 206). 
STUART filed its Notice of Appeal on October 27, 1989 
(R. 208). On November 17, 1989 STUART moved the Utah Supreme 
Court for summary disposition in its favor pursuant to Rule 
10(A)(3) of the rules of that Court. After JOHN DEERE filed its 
Memorandum in Opposition to that motion, the Utah Supreme Court 
denied STUART'S motion on December 22, 1989. 
Statement pf thg Fectg 
JOHN DEERE is an insurance company which provides 
insurance for John Deere & Company (-Deere & Company-), the 
manufacturers of heavy equipment (R. 128). One of the policies by 
which JOHN DEERE insures Deere & Company is a Retail Instalment 
Sales Floater Policy No. IM-14319 (hereafter -Master Policy") 
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(R. 128). The Master Policy insures property owned by Deere & 
Company, and property sold under contract wherever that property 
is located (R. 68, 77). The effective date of the Master Policy 
is January 1, 1982 (R. 128). The Master Policy originally 
included an "Attachment of Insurance- provision, which provided, 
in part, as follows, 
This insurance terminates when the actual maturity date 
of the note is reached or the date on which the security 
interest of John Deere in said equipment terminates, 
whichever first occurs. 
(R. 128, 68). This shall hereafter be referred to as the 
"termination language." 
In 1983, it was the agreement and intention of the 
parties to the Master Policy, JOHN DEERE and Deere & Company, that 
the Master Policy would be changed to cover not only the actual 
financed merchandise, but to cover any additional security in 
favor of Deere & Company (R. 128). This additional security 
insurance amendment to the Master Policy was the only change 
contemplated and agreed to by the parties (R. 129). Initially, it 
was not put into writing. Between 1983 and 1989, JOHN DEERE 
honored all claims for loss of or damage to non-financed 
merchandise and equipment, notwithstanding the fact that no 
formal, written amendment was made to that portion of the Master 
Policy (R. 129). 
In June, 1988, Deborah Kamenetzky, an in-house attorney 
for JOHN DEERE, undertook to revise the language in the Attachment 
of Insurance provision to reflect the intention of the parties 
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regarding non-financial merchandise (R. 129). This change in the 
Master Policy was not formalized by writing until January, 1989 
(10 months after STUART suffered its loss and 5 years after it 
purchased the insurance) (R. 2, 129). By a clerical error, the 
termination language was omitted from the amended Attachment of 
Insurance provision (R. 129, 131, 81). 
Because John Deere's security interest in the various 
machinery and equipment it sells under contract will vary per the 
terms of each and every individual contract, the Master Policy is 
not sent to them. Rather, individual certificates of insurance 
are sent to each of the additional insured, such as STUART (R. 9). 
On December 20, 1983 STUART purchased a 1984 John Deere 
backhoe ("Backhoe") from Scott Machinery Company in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. This purchase was primarily on credit, since STUART 
paid $23,406.50 of the $82,266.50 sales price (R. 7). STUART 
executed a Retail Purchase Instalment Contract (••Contract'*) by 
which it applied for credit from the John Deere Industrial 
Equipment Company to finance the remaining $62,194.29 of the 
purchase price (R. 7). The Contract provided for monthly payments 
to be made to John Deere by STUART, beginning on April 1, 1984 and 
ending on April 1, 1988 (R. 7). John Deere Industrial accepted 
the Contract on March 7, 1984 (R. 7). 
The Contract also required STUART to obtain physical 
damage insurance for the Backhoe (R. 8). The reason for this 
requirement was simple — until John Deere Industrial was paid 
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off, it wanted to make sure that there was adequate insurance on 
the Backhoe to protect its security interest. The Contract 
contained the following language: 
If physical damage insurance is purchased by holder, I 
(we) will be furnished a certificate which describes the 
insurance. Such insurance shall terminate if the 
indebtedness is discharged, or if the holder's security 
interest in the equipment terminates, . . . or at the end 
of the term of the contract. . . . Any refunds or return 
premiums shall be applied toward existing indebtedness 
hereunder with the excess, if any, returned to me (us). 
(R. 8). 
STUART elected to purchase insurance from JOHN DEERE and 
paid a premium in the amount of $2,972.29 (R. 7). After John 
Deere Industrial accepted the Contract, it sent a Certificate of 
Physical Insurance ("Certificate of Insurance") to STUART. After 
STUART received the Certificate of Insurance, and presumably read 
its terms and description of insurance, STUART did not cancel the 
insurance and purchase insurance with different terms. STUART 
elected to keep the Backhoe insured under the terms described in 
the Certificate of Insurance. 
STUART's certificate of insurance set forth the relevant 
dates of the Master Policy as it applied to STUART. The effective 
date of the insurance as to STUART was December 20, 1983, the date 
of purchase (R. 9). In addition to this information, the 
Certificate of Insurance repeated to STUART what the Contract had 
stated: 
This certifies that the equipment . . . is insured . . . 
until the expiration date shown above unless the 
insurance is terminated sooner as provided in the next 
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sentence. The insurance shall terminate immediately 
without notice if any one of the following events occurs: 
the indebtedness is discharged; John Deere's security 
interest in the property which is the subject of the 
contract terminates; . . . or the Retail Instalment Sales 
Floater Policy under which John Deere has purchased the 
insurance is terminated. 
(R. 9). 
STUART never relied upon the Master Policy, nor did 
STUART even see a copy of the Master Policy until after this 
litigation commenced (R. 196, 206) (See, also, STUART'S Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Disposition, p. 6). In its Complaint, STUART alleged that the 
Contract was the insurance policy. •'Defendant issued to Plaintiff 
a Physical Damage Insurance Policy, No. 870276283AA. . . .H 
(R. 2). The Contract is not the insurance agreement. 
On or about January 20, 1988, STUART contacted John Deere 
Credit Services and requested a payoff amount (R.34). STUART was 
advised that the Backhoe could be paid off in full by February 10, 
1988 for the sum of $5,578.72 (R. 34). On February 5, 1988, 
STUART paid $5,578.72 to John Deere Credit, which included a 
credit for the unearned insurance premium (R. 35). 
On March 9, 1988 the Backhoe was destroyed by fire of 
unknown origin (R. 2). STUART made a claim against what it 
thought was the insurance policy, which claim was denied by JOHN 
DEERE for the reason that upon STUART'S early payoff, the 
indebtedness was discharged and Deere & Company no longer had a 
security interest in the Backhoe (R. 2). STUART then brought its 
lawsuit. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the lower court for the reason 
that it correctly ruled as a matter of law that STUART'S 
unilateral act of paying the Backhoe off ended insurance coverage 
more than one month before the Backhoe was allegedly destroyed* 
STUART saw two writings regarding its insurance coverage before it 
suffered its loss. One was its sales contract, and the other was 
a certificate of insurance. Each of those writings clearly and 
unambiguously told STUART its coverage would end when it paid the 
Backhoe off. STUART received the contract, received the 
certificate of insurance, and elected to keep that insurance. It 
had the option to purchase insurance with different terms, and did 
not do so. 
Now, STUART is grasping at straws, attempting to 
establish coverage where there is none. The largest straw is in 
the form of an amendment to the Master Policy — an amendment 
which was not in writing until January, 1989, more than five years 
after STUART bought the Backhoe and the insurance. That amendment 
mistakenly omitted certain language similar to that contained in 
the Contract and Certificate of Insurance. The amendment did not 
change the language stating insurance ends upon payoff — it 
merely omitted it. The amendment has no legal effect upon the 
policy's termination provisions contained in the writings. 
This Court should affirm the lower court's judgment that 
the Certificate of Insurance and the Master Policy constitute an 
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insurance agreement which ended when STUART fulfilled the 
conditions to end coverage . . • payoff of the Backhoe. JOHN 
DEERE did not cancel the policy. The policy expired by its own 
terms, and therefore no notice was required by Utah statute to be 
given. STUART did not pay for coverage beyond February 5, 1988, 
and is not entitled to coverage beyond that date. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
A. STUART CANNOT MEET THE STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
STUART cannot demonstrate that the lower court committed 
reversible error. Its opportunity to present evidence meriting a 
full trial has passed. The Utah Supreme Court has recently 
reiterated the standard of review on appeals from summary judgment. 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 'we consider 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing 
party, and affirm only where it appears there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material issues of fact/ or 
where, even according to the facts as contended by the 
losing party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.• 
D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989) (citation 
omitted). The "evidence" which this Court must consider is 
limited, however, solely to the evidence of record. The Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure require that when a motion for summary 
judgment is supported by specific facts, "an adverse party . . . 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial.- Rule 56(e) Utah R. Civ. P. 
JOHN DEERE's motion was supported by specific facts — 
the affidavits of Terry Digman, Howard Payne, and Deborah 
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Kamenetzky (R. 34-44, 45-53, 63-92, and 128-137). STUART did not 
and cannot contest any of the facts upon which JOHN DEERE relied 
in its motion. STUART has agreed that there are no issues of 
material fact upon which a genuine dispute exists (R. 93-94). 
STUART conceded as much when it made its own cross motion for 
summary judgment (R. 107). STUART submitted no affirmative 
affidavits in opposition to JOHN DEERE1s motion for summary 
judgment. Therefore, there are only legal issues to be resolved 
here. 
In construing Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which Rule's subsection is worded identically to the 
Utah Rule 56(c), the United States Supreme Court has stated: 
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates 
the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for 
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of 
an element essential to that party's case, and on which 
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In 
such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to 
any material fact,M since a complete failure of proof 
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's 
case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 at 322-323, 106 S. Ct. 
2548, at 2552, 91 L.Ed. 265, at 273 (1986). Although the Utah 
Supreme Court has not precisely adopted this position in any 
written opinions to date, this Court has cited Celotex with 
approval in Reeves v. Geicry Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 
642 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and in Robinson v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
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B. THE INSURANCE AGREEMENT UNAMBIGUOUSLY STATES THAT WHEN STUART 
PAID THE BACKHOE OFF. COVERAGE ENDED. 
The insurance agreement is not ambiguous, for the reason 
that all writings, taken together, clearly convey the intent of 
the parties that when the indebtedness secured by the Backhoe was 
paid off, the Backhoe would no longer be covered by the policy. 
1. Contract Ambiguity is A Question of Law. 
STUART makes inconsistent arguments regarding whether a 
contract's ambiguity is a factual or legal matter. On the same 
page of its Brief, STUART states the following: -The issue of 
whether a writing that is before the court is an integration 
adopted by the parties as the complete expression of their bargain 
is a question of fact to be resolved by the jury." (STUART Brief 
at p. 13). This is not correct. STUART was correct when it later 
asserted, on the same page: "Likewise, after a court makes a legal 
determination that ambiguities exist in a contract, parol or 
extraneous evidence becomes admissible to determine the factual 
issue of the parties intentions concerning the ambiguity." (Id.) 
(emphasis added). The Faulkner case cited by STUART is 
unequivocal on the point. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 
1293 (Utah 1983). Contract interpretation, including whether a 
contract is ambiguous, is a question of law. 
2. STUART'S Arguments Are Ingenuous In Light Of The 
Writings It Had, And The Language Thev Contained. 
STUART is before this court arguing it is entitled to the 
benefit of a clerical error which omitted language from the Master 
Policy, which error was made months after STUART suffered its 
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loss, and years after STUART was told what the policy's terms 
were. The only documents STUART ever saw, before this suit 
commenced, unequivocally told STUART that insurance coverage would 
end when STUART paid the Backhoe off. The actual language of the 
documents, and the context within which they came to STUART'S 
attention are important because of the "intention of the parties" 
and "meeting of the minds" issues inherent in any contract 
interpretation. A clear picture of the writings at issue is also 
important because STUART continues to confuse the Insurance Policy 
and the Certificate of Insurance, each of which is a separate 
writing, but both of which constitute the insurance agreement 
governing the relationship between these parties. 
3. STUART Relied And Continues To Rely Upon The 
Certificate Of Insurance. 
In its Brief, STUART refers to an "Insurance Contract" 
which it defined as the Policy No. IM-14319. (STUART Brief at 
p. 4) Yet STUART asserts that "the backhoe was to be insured 
through April 1, 1988, under such policy." (i£.) The Master 
Policy does not contain an expiration date. This is because JOHN 
DEERE and Deere & Company, as the insurer and the named insured, 
desired that the Master Policy remain in force, as to them, until 
either of them cancelled the policy (R. 72). However, different 
time periods apply to the many additional insureds, such as 
STUART. Because STUART and the hundreds of other additional 
insureds under the Master Policy have different loan terms and 
different equipment, JOHN DEERE sends to each of the additional 
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insureds a certificate of insurance, similar to that upon which 
STUART originally relied when it filed its lawsuit. 
When STUART bought the Backhoe, it paid a premium for 
insurance, as reflected in the Contract (R. 7). The Contract 
clearly informed STUART what it should expect with respect to the 
insurance it bought. That language stated as follows: 
If physical damage insurance is purchased by holder, I 
(we) will be furnished a certificate which describes the 
insurance. Such insurance shall terminate if the 
indebtedness is discharged, or if the holder's security 
interest in the equipment terminates, . . . or at the end 
of the term of the contract. . . . Any refunds or return 
premiums shall be applied toward existing indebtedness 
hereunder with the excess, if any, returned to me (us). 
(R. 8). Therefore, immediately upon the Backhoe's purchase, 
STUART was told that the insurance it bought would end upon the 
debt being satisfied, and that any unused premium would be 
returned or credited. 
The next and only other insurance related writing STUART 
received prior to its claim for loss of the Backhoe was the 
Certificate of Insurance. That Certificate contained the 
following language: 
This certifies that the equipment . . . is insured . . . 
until the expiration date shown above unless the 
insurance is terminated sooner as provided in the next 
sentence. The insurance shall terminate immediately 
without notice if any one of the following events occurs: 
the indebtedness is discharged; John Deerefs security 
interest in the property which is the subject of the 
contract terminates; . . . or the Retail Instalment Sales 
Floater Policy under which John Deere has purchased the 
insurance is terminated. 
(R. 9). The Certificate of Insurance described the term of the 
insurance. The insurance was to run to the expiration date or 
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until the indebtedness was discharged, the security interest in 
the Backhoe terminated, or the Contract was terminated, all of 
which took place on February 5, 1988• If STUART had paid the 
Backhoe off three years earlier, or two years earlier, the result 
would have been the same. The insurance would have ended and 
STUART would have received a credit for unearned premium. 
The Contract and the Certificate of Insurance were both 
clear, consistent, and unambiguous as to the events which would 
trigger the termination of the insurance. STUART only saw those 
documents before it brought suit. 
a. STUART sgw the Master Ppliqy only after the 
lawsuit was commenced. 
Since the lawsuit was filed, STUART learned that the 
Certificate of Insurance was not the actual policy, and STUART 
obtained a copy of the policy from JOHN DEERE*s counsel in 
connection with requests for admission which were sent to STUART'S 
counsel (R. 54). 
In spite of the fact that STUART never saw the Master 
Policy, it is now claiming that an amendment to the Master Policy 
which amendment was formalized in January, 1989, has removed the 
termination language from the Master Policy. This amendment was 
not contained in the original version of the Master Policy, which 
was attached to JOHN DEERE's memorandum supporting its motion for 
summary judgment (R. 45, 49). The original policy was attached to 
the October 13, 1988 Affidavit of Howard J. Payne (R. 45). After 
filing its motion for summary judgment, JOHN DEERE realized that 
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the form of the policy attached to Mr. Payne's original affidavit 
was not completely current, and so JOHN DEERE caused the Amended 
Affidavit of Mr. Payne, dated April 10, 1989, to be filed in 
support of the summary judgment motion (R. 63-92). This amended 
affidavit contained the January, 1989, formalized amendment to the 
Master Policy. 
It was not until Mr. Payne's amended affidavit had been 
filed, and after JOHN DEERE consented to allow STUART additional 
time to respond (R. 57), that STUART noticed and attempted to take 
advantage of the amendment when it finally filed its Memorandum in 
Opposition and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The focus of STUART'S argument is found in the 
Endorsement dated 1 September, 1983 (R. 81). The Endorsement 
states it amends the "Attachment of Insurance" provision contained 
earlier in the Policy. The two paragraphs are set forth herein so 
that comparison is easy for this Court. The original policy's 
Attachment of Insurance provision reads as follows: 
The insurance hereby provided shall apply only to those 
items of merchandise on which, according to the Named 
Insured's records, insurance was purchased at the time 
the financing agreement was made and as respects each 
such item, the insurance shall attach as of (a) the time 
the Additional Insured takes possession thereof or (b) 
the time of execution and acceptance of the note, 
whichever occurs first. This insurance terminates when 
the actual maturity date of the note is reached or the 
date on which the security interest of John Deere in said 
equipment terminates, whichever first occurs. 
(R. 68). The amended paragraph, incorporating coverage for 
non-financed property, reads as follows: 
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The insurance hereby provided shall apply only to those 
items of financed merchandise 2£ additional security on 
which, according to the Named Insured's records, 
insurance was purchased at the time the financing 
agreement was made. As respects each item of financed 
merchandise, the insurance shall attach as of (a) the 
time the additional Insured takes possession thereof or 
(b) the time of acceptance of the note by John Deere, 
whichever occurs first. &£ respects each item fif. 
additional security, the insurance shall attach as of the 
time of acceptance of the note by John Deere. 
(R. 81) (emphasis added). Importantly, the Endorsement also 
states that M[n]othing herein contained shall be held to vary, 
waive, alter, or extend any of the terms, conditions, agreements 
or declarations of the policy, other than as herein stated.H 
(R. 81). 
4. Under Accepted Rules Of Contract Interpretation. The 
Certificate Of Insurance Is Part Of The Policy. 
This Court should determine that the insurance agreement 
is not ambiguous, in light of the language contained in the 
Insurance Policy, the Contract, and the Certificate of Insurance. 
Contrary to STUART'S assertion that an issue of fact exists 
regarding the intent of the parties (STUART Brief at p. 13), 
whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, which this 
Court may decide without particular deference to the lower court's 
conclusions. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 
1983); Jones v. Hinkle. 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980) 
(••Interpretation of a written contract is ordinarily a question of 
law, and this Court need not defer to the trial court's 
construction.-) Therefore, this Court should ignore STUART'S 
attempts to have the matter remanded, and affirm the lower court's 
decision for the reasons stated herein. 
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This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have stated the 
general rule of contract interpretation in many cases. That rule 
is as follows: 
[I]f the language of the contract is such that the 
intention of the parties is clearly and unequivocally 
expressed, it must be enforced according to its terms. 
But conversely, if there is a basis in its language upon 
which the parties reasonably could have a 
misunderstanding with respect to its intent, then 
extraneous evidence can be received and considered to 
ascertain it. Moreover, in making that determination, 
± M court is not bound by any single provision QJL 
expression, bui Should look £fi £ M whole CQntrgct M its 
purpose. 
Winoets, Inc. v. Bitters. 500 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Utah 1972) 
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). STUART cannot claim a 
"misunderstanding*1 with respect to the intent of JOHN DEERE and 
Deere & Company. And certainly STUART can claim no 
misunderstanding of an amendment which did not exist until 10 
months after its date of loss. 
Rather than look solely to the amendment of the 
Attachment of Insurance provision (R. 81) as STUART suggests, this 
Court should carefully consider the "whole" contract and its 
purpose, to interpret it. 
Before looking at the whole contract, this Court should 
also note its definition of "ambiguous", as used less than two 
years ago in C.J. Realty. Inc. v. Willey. 758 P.2d 923 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). In that case, this Court stated, 
A contract is considered ambiguous if 'the words 
used to express the meaning and intention of the parties 
are insufficient in a sense that the contract may be 
understood to reach two or more plausible meanings.1 
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Id. at 928 (citation omitted). Applying this definition of 
ambiguous to the insurance agreement as a whole, there are no Mtwo 
or more plausible meanings" suggested by any words in the 
agreement. Rather, all of the writings, taken together, 
unambiguously state that the insurance coverage ends upon STUART'S 
discharge of indebtedness and termination of the security interest 
in the Backhoe, both of which took place on February 5, 1988. The 
January, 1989 amendment never purported to change the termination 
language contained in the Certificate of Insurance. 
This Court should not limit its review of the writings 
solely to the Master Policy to determine the intent of the 
parties. The Certificate of Insurance and the Contract also 
constitute writings which set forth and describe the terms of the 
contract contemplated by the parties at the time STUART purchased 
the Backhoe. Utah law is clear that other writings should be 
included in insurance contracts. HAs a general rule: 
endorsements, riders, marginal references, and other writings 
which constitute a part of the contract of insurance are to be 
read and construed with the policy proper." St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. v. Commercial Union Assurance, 606 P.2d 1206, 1208 
(Utah 1980) (footnote omitted). 
a. This Court should ignore the Certificate's 
disclaimer lgnqugqe. 
STUART may argue that the Certificate of Insurance should 
not be considered part of the policy. Arguably, the Certificate 
of Insurance is not part of the contract because of some language 
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it contains. The Certificate of Insurance states it His not a 
contract of Insurance and [Deere and Company] does not undertake 
any responsibility as an insurer. The rights of all parties are 
governed solely by the aforementioned policy, issued by the JOHN 
DEERE INSURANCE COMPANY." (R. 9). For the reasons set forth 
below, this Court may disregard this language. However, even if 
this Court chooses to apply this language, it simply makes clear 
that the Certificate was not the entire agreement, that Deere & 
Company was not the insurer, and that the Master Policy, to which 
JOHN DEERE was a party, is the "policy proper" as the meaning of 
that phrase was implied by the court in the St. Paul case, supra. 
STUART is hard put to suggest that the Certificate of 
Insurance can have no role in the insurance agreement's 
interpretation. It is the Certificate of Insurance, and not the 
Master Policy, which sets forth the insurance's effective date of 
December 20, 1983 and expiration date of April 1, 1988, upon which 
STUART relies (STUART Brief at 4, 18-19, 21). 
b* The majority rule requires inclusion of the 
Certificate in the policy. 
JOHN DEERE's research found no Utah caselaw on the 
subject of whether a certificate of insurance may be considered 
part of the insurance contract. However, courts in other states 
have considered the issue and suggest that the Certificate of 
Insurance should be considered part of the insurance agreement. 
In Fittro v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co.. 757 
P.2d 1374 (Wash. 1988) (en banc), the Supreme Court of Washington 
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recognized the majority rule that "the coverage provisions stated 
in a certificate of coverage furnished to an insured by the 
insurer takes precedence over conflicting terms in the master 
policy.- Icl. at 1376 (citations omitted). This Court need not go 
even that far, since there are no conflicting terms. As amended, 
the Master Policy is silent on termination. 
STUART may also argue the disclaimer language in the 
Certificate of Insurance in this case should take it out of the 
majority rule. The disclaimer language does not take it out of 
the majority rule. The Fittro case had a similar problem, since 
the certificate of insurance in that case expressly stated that 
the certificate "was not an insurance policy and did not alter or 
amend the provisions of the policy.H Jjl. at 1377. The Fittro 
court addressed this directly and stated: 
Such disclaimer language should not be given effect when 
the certificate is issued under statutory mandate and is 
the only document the insured is likely to see before 
incurring expenses for covered injuries. A disclaimer is 
standard boilerplate language in certificates. A clear 
majority of those courts that have considered similar 
disclaimer provisions in other certificates have not 
given effect to the disclaimer and have instead enforced 
the broader coverage suggested in the certificate. 
2&. (emphasis by court)(citations omitted). Applying the Fittro 
analysis to this case, the Certificate of Insurance should be 
considered part of the policy, and its provisions regarding 
termination should be given effect. This is especially true where 
there are no policy provisions which conflict with the certificate 
language. The amended Attachment of Insurance provision (R. 81) 
is now merely silent on the point of termination. 
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c. Public Policy reasons strongly support 
inclusion of the Certificate in the policy. 
As a matter of public policy, this Court should adopt the 
majority rule that in situations where the insured is likely only 
to see the certificate of insurance, the provisions in the 
certificate should be given effect, whether those provisions 
conflict with the master policy or not. The obvious policy 
consideration here is one of reliance. "[T]he certificates of 
insurance are a part of the contract of insurance and . . . an 
individual insured ha[s] the right to expect the coverage 
described in the certificate where a change in the master policy 
was not reflected in the individual's certificate of insurance." 
Martin v. Crown Life Ins. Co,, 658 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Mont. 1983). 
d. STUART cannot claim anv prejudice bv inclusion 
of the Certificate in the policy. 
In the case of STUART, no injustice results in holding 
STUART to the Certificate of Insurance's provisions regarding 
termination, since STUART never saw the Master Policy before the 
lawsuit (R. 206). Indeed, the actual writing by which the 
Attachment of Insurance paragraph was amended did not exist prior 
to January, 1989 (R. 129). As a matter of public policy, and 
because STUART is not prejudiced, this Court should adopt the 
majority rule that certificates of insurance are part of the 
insurance contract, and that if a conflict exists between the 
certificate and the master policy, the certificate should apply. 
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5. Even Without The Certificate Of Insurance, The 
Master Policy Should Be Read To End Coverage Upon 
STUART'S Pavoff. 
Even if this Court determines that the Certificate of 
Insurance is not part of the insurance contract/ the Master Policy 
provides for termination/ in spite of the amendment to the 
Attachment of Insurance provision. 
The amendment is merely silent on the subject of 
termination. The lower court specifically referenced the language 
of the Endorsement which states, "Nothing herein contained shall 
be held to vary, waive# alter, or extend any of the terms, 
conditions, agreements or declarations of the policy, other that 
as stated herein." (R. 81, 196) (Emphasis added). The fact is 
that nothing in the Endorsement was "stated" about the termination 
language contained in the original version. Paragraph 22 of the 
Master Policy (R. 74) makes clear that since the Endorsement did 
not expressly conflict or vary with the original Instalment Sales 
Floater, the termination language was not affected by the 
Endorsement. Therefore, as a matter of law, the termination 
language remained in the Master Policy. To the extent that it is 
not inconsistent with the Attachment of Insurance provision 
contained in the endorsement, the terms of the original Attachment 
of Insurance provision, including the provision terminating the 
policy when the note matures or when the security interest of 
Deere & Company in the equipment terminates, remained in force. 
STUART'S argument to the contrary contradicts both the clear 
language of the policy and elementary rules of contract 
interpretation. 
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The insurance agreement is unambiguous, and this Court 
should affirm the lower court's determination that coverage ended 
when STUART paid the Backhoe off, 
C. EVEN IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT THE INSURANCE AGREEMENT IS 
AMBIGUOUS, THE UNDISPUTED PAROL, EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IN THIS 
CASE IS THAT THE TERMINATION LANGUAGE IN THE ORIGINAL 
ATTACHMENT OF INSURANCE PROVISION WAS OMITTED ONLY BY CLERICAL 
ERROR, AND THAT THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES ALWAYS HAS BEEN, AND 
CONTINUES TO BE, THAT PAYOFF OF THE BACKHOE ENDS COVERAGE, 
Even if this Court finds that the Insurance Policy is 
ambiguous on the point of whether paying off the debt on the 
Backhoe and receiving a refund of the unearned premium result in 
an automatic end of coverage/ there is no reason to remand the 
case back to the trial court for taking of parol evidence. This 
Court should affirm the lower court's decision for the reason that 
it implicitly found that the Policy was ambiguous, and that parol 
evidence was proper and necessary to determine the meaning of the 
Policy. That parol evidence was contained in the affidavit of 
Deborah Kamenetzky (R. 196-197). STUART has conceded in its 
Brief, and rightly so, that if a court determines a contract is 
ambiguous it may go on to consider parol evidence (STUART Brief 
at 13). 
The fact that Deere & Company and JOHN DEERE have always 
intended that the insurance coverage as to additional insured 
would automatically end upon payoff is not disputed. The fact 
that the termination language was omitted from the amended 
Attachment of Insurance paragraph in the Master Policy by clerical 
error is not disputed. 
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1. STUART Cannot Dispute The Parol Evidence, 
STUART has produced no evidence to suggest that the 
parties ever intended anything other than what STUART was told by 
the Contract and by the Certificate of Insurance. In fact, it is 
also undisputed that while a clerical error occurred in the Master 
Policy, Ms. Kamenetzky made modifications to the form of 
certificates of insurance sent to Deere & Company customers, and 
those have not changed (R. 129). From January 1, 1982, every 
certificate of insurance issued to Utah resident purchasers of 
John Deere equipment under the Insurance Policy has included the 
same termination language (R. 129). 
STUART has waived its rights to challenge Ms. 
Kamenetzky's veracity since it never moved pursuant to Rule 56(f) 
to conduct any discovery of JOHN DEERE for the purpose of 
marshalling evidence to oppose JOHN DEERE's summary judgment 
motion. Just such a marshalling is what the U.S. Supreme Court 
has required since its Celotex decision, supra. Similarly, this 
Court should not allow STUART to come forward now to complain 
about an affidavit it had for weeks before the hearing on this 
matter took place. 
a. STUART'S failure to move to strike the 
Kamenetzky Affidavit waives any evidentiary 
objections thereto. 
STUART waived its rights to complain about the Kamenetzky 
Affidavit when it never moved to strike the affidavit. Even if 
consideration of the Kamenetzky Affidavit were central to the 
trial court's ruling, the trial court's consideration of it was 
proper and justified. 
-31-
STUART had the Kamenetzky Affidavit for weeks prior to 
the hearing and never moved the trial court to strike it. The 
decisions of this Court and of the Utah Supreme Court make clear 
that a party's failure to object to or move to strike an affidavit 
constitutes a waiver of formal or evidentiary defects in the 
affidavit. Hobelman Motors, Inc. v. Allred, 685 P.2d 544, 546 
(Utah 1984); Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 
P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983); Strange v. Ostlund, 594 P.2d 877, 880 
(Utah 1979); Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 498 P.2d 352, 353-354 
(Utah 1972); Fox v. Allstate Ins. Co., 453 P.2d 701, 702-703 (Utah 
1969); Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 
42, 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
For the reason that STUART never moved to strike the 
Kamenetzky Affidavit prior to or at the hearing, it was not error 
for the trial court to consider it. 
D. BECAUSE THE POLICY TERMINATED OF ITS OWN ACCORD AND BY ITS 
OWN TERMS, AND BECAUSE JOHN DEERE DID NOT CANCEL THE POLICY, 
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 70C-6-304 AND 31A-21-303(2) UTAH 
CODE ANNOT. DO NOT APPLY 
STUART suggests at page 21 of its Brief that because JOHN 
DEERE did not mail a notice of cancellation to STUART prior to the 
Backhoe's burning up, the provisions of Sections 70C-6-304 and 
31A-21-303(2) require that the insurance agreement remain in 
force. Neither of these sections is applicable to these facts for 
the reason that JOHN DEERE did not cancel this insurance. The 
unilateral act of STUART in paying off the indebtedness, alone, 
ended coverage. 
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1. Both Sections Contemplate Cancellation, Which Did 
Not Take Place, 
Section 70C-6-304 reads, in pertinent part, that "A 
creditor may not request cancellation of a policy of property or 
liability insurance except after the debtor's default or in 
accordance with a written authorization by the debtor, . . ." 
STUART did not set forth as an undisputed fact, nor can it, that 
John Deere & Company, as STUART's creditor, requested JOHN DEERE 
to "cancel" the insurance. This is an express condition precedent 
to the applicability of this section. 
For similar reasons, Section 31A-21-303 does not apply. 
It states, in pertinent part, that "no insurance policy may be 
cancelled by the insurer prior to the expiration of the agreed 
term or one year from the effective date of the policy or renewal, 
whichever is less. . . . " Section 31A-21-303(2)(a) (emphasis 
added). The "agreed term" herein was for the period during which 
STUART owed money on the Backhoe. That term ended prior to the 
loss. 
a. The statutes' ppliqi^g flon't apply h$re. 
The policy reasons behind these two statutes are 
obvious. If an insurer decides to cancel a policy for reasons 
unknown to the insured, the insured is entitled to some notice to 
protect itself. Those policy reasons do not apply when an 
additional insured does the very acts which it was told up front 
would result in automatic termination, without notice. STUART was 
told that the terms of this policy call for termination upon 
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payoff^ and STUART elected to keep the insurance under those 
terms. It also goes without saying that the refund of the 
unearned premium which STUART received when it made the payoff 
does not entitle it to further insurance coverage. 
2. Other Courts Have Held That Expiration Is Not 
Cancellation. 
Only seven months ago, the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Arkansas in the case of Lawrence v. John Deere 
Ins. Co., Case No. 87-6108, (W.D. Ark. June 19, 1989), addressed 
the identical issue of "cancellation" versus "termination" in a 
case involving an early pay-off (R. 167-175). In that case/ the 
court relied upon the language of the certificate of insurance (R. 
170) and ruled that Arkansas, as well as other states, had 
"recognized the distinction between cancellation of a policy and 
the expiration of a policy by its own terms." (R. 173). The court 
went on to cite Farmers Insurance Company of Arkansas v. Hall, 567 
S.W.2d 296 (Ark. 1978), Morey v. Educator & Executive Insurers, 
Inc., 342 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 1976) overruled on other grounds, 
DeBose v. Travelers Insurance Co.. 451 «.E. 2d 753, 754 <Ohit> 
1983), Anthony v. National Grange Mutual Insurance Co. 309 A.2d 
919 (N.H. 1973) and Shiaras v. Chupp, 334 N.E.2d 129 (111. 1975) 
in support of the proposition that a policy's expiring by its own 
terms is not the equivalent of cancellation (R. 174). 
The Lawrence case was appealed to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the judgment of the 
lower court. (Copy of Eighth Circuit decision appended hereto as 
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Addendum HAM.) Applying the rationale of the above cases and the 
plain meaning of "cancel" to these facts, this Court should find 
that JOHN DEERE did not cancel the insurance policy as to STUART. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Respondents respectfully 
request that this Court affirm the judgment of the Second District 
Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Mark O. Morris 
Attorneys for JOHN DEERE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant/Respondent 
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ADDENDUM A 
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
NO. 89-2196 
Rex Lawrence, * 
* 
Appellant, * 
* Appeal from the United States 
v. * District Court for the 
* Western District of Arkansas. 
John Deere Insurance Company, * 
* 
Appellee. * 
Submitted: November 20, 1989 
Filed: December 15, 1989 
Before McMILLlAN, JOHN R. GIBSON, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges. 
PER CURIAM. 
Rex Lawrence appeals from the district court's1 entry of 
judgment, after a bench trial, in favor of John Deere Insurance 
company in this diversity action brought by Lawrence to collect on 
a claim he filed with the insurance company. We affirm. 
On October 24, 1S84, Lawrence purchased a John Deere 640 Log 
Skidder from an authorized John Deere dealer. He arranged to 
finance the purchase with John Deere Industrial Equipment Company 
under a Variable Rate Loan Contract-Security Agreement. Under the 
terms of the contract, Lawrence was required to obtain physical 
Vhe Honorable Oren Harris, Senior Judge, United States 
District Court for the Western District of Arkansas. 
damage insurance on the log-skidder. He elected to have - the 
equipment company purchase the insurance from John Deere Insurance 
Company, and was thereby able to finance the cost of the insurance 
as well. The $8,424.00 insurance premium was paid by the equipment 
company to the insurance company in a lump sum at the commencement 
of the contract. 
The total amount financed was $80,031.00, which was to be paid 
in thirty-six monthly installments of $2,734.66 beginning December 
31, 1984. The loan contract provided that the insurance would 
terminate if the indebtedness was discharged or at the end of the 
term of the contract, which would have been November 1, 1987 if the 
entire thirty-six monthc were needed to pay off the loan. The 
contract also provided that any refunds of returned insurance 
premiums would be applied toward existing indebtedness. 
Because of the variable interest rate, as of September 1, 
1987, the amount due on the loan was only $1,134.38. Lawrence 
received a statement dated September 10, 1987, showing a contract 
payoff amount of $897.56• This amount was computed by taking the 
unearned insurance premium into account, which was to be applied 
to the loan when the last payment from Lawrence was received. On 
September 29, 1987, the equipment company received Lawrence's 
payment. On the same day the unearned insurance premium was 
credited to his account, discharging the debt. 
On October 5, 1987, the log skidder caught fire, sustaining 
over $23,000.00 in damages. Lawrence filed a claim for the loss. 
The insurance company refused to pay, informing Lawrence that the 
insurance had terminated on September 29th when the indebtedness 
was discharged. Lawrence brought suit claiming the insurance 
company unilaterally cancelled the policy, thereby creating the 
refund with which to discharge the debt, which he argued the 
company could not do without notice. In the alternative, he argued 
2 
that the terms of the contract were ambiguous and therefore should 
be construed to provide coverage for thirty-six months. 
The district court, noting the distinction under Arkansas law 
between cancellation of an insurance policy and expiration by its 
own terms, found that the insurance coverage was not cancelled, but 
that it terminated. The court also concluded that it was clear 
from the contract that the insurance automatically terminated when 
either the indebtedness was discharged or at the end of thirty-six 
months, whichever occurred first. 
After careful consideration of the record and the arguments 
of the partiesr we find no deficiency in the district court1 s 
analysis of the case. See Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. T.ri-State 
Ins. Co,. 827 F.2d 373, 375 (8th Cir. 1987) (interpretation of 
forum's state law made by resident district court judge overturned 
only if fundamentally deficient in analysis, without a reasonable 
basis, or contrary to reported state court opinion. Accordingly, 
we affirm on the basis of its thorough and well reasoned opinion. 
&eg 8th Cir* R. 14. 
A true copy. 
Attest: 
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT. 
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ADDENDUM B 
)DE COURT OF APPEALS 78-2a-3 
R 2a 
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a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
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1 a successor is appointed and ap-
mder Section 20-1-7.1," into the 
hird and fourth sentences and made 
rtistic changes. 
78-2a-3, Court of Appeals jurisdiction, 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs involving a 
criminal conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding but not limited to divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court, may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment by Laws 1988, Chapter 73, effective April 
25, 1988, inserted subsection designations (a) 
and (b) in Subsection (1); inserted "resulting 
from formal adjudicative proceedings" in Sub-
section (2)(a); substituted "state agencies" for 
"state and local agencies" in Subsection (2)(a); 
substituted "informal adjudicative proceedings 
of the agencies" for "them" in Subsection (2)(a); 
deleted "notwithstanding any other provision 
of law" at the end of Subsection <2Ka); inserted 
Subsection (b); redesignated former Subsec-
tions (2Kb) to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to 
(2)(i); added "except those from the small 
claims department of a circuit court" at the end 
of Subsection (2)(d); and made minor stylistic 
changes. 
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chap-
ter 210, effective April 25,1988, added Subsec-
tion (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsection 
(2)(h) as Subsection (2)(i). 
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chap-
ter 248, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection 
(2)(a), rewrote the phrase before "except" 
which had read "the final orders and decrees of 
state and local agencies or appeals from the 
district court review of them"; deleted "not-
withstanding any other provision of law" at the 
end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted present Sub-
section (2Kb); designated former Subsections 
(2Kb) to (2Kh) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); and 
substituted "first degree or capital felony" for 
"first or capital degree felony" in present Sub-
section (2)(f). 
78-3-1 JUDICIAL CODE 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Cross-References. — Composition and ju-
risdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 
39-6-16. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
Post-conviction review. 
Scope. 
Cited. 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
The language of Subsection (2)(g) is suffi-
ciently broad to include those cases where a 
criminal conviction is involved in a habeas cor-
pus proceeding challenging extradition. 
Hernandez v. Hayward, 764 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
Post-conviction review. 
Post-conviction review may be used to attack 
a conviction in the event of an obvious injustice 
or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a con-
stitutional right in the trial. Gomm v. Cook, 
754 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Scope. 
This statute defines the outermost limits of 
appellate jurisdiction, allowing the Court of 
Appeals to review agency decisions only when 
the legislature expressly authorizes a right of 
review. It is not a catchall provision authoriz-
ing the court to review the orders of every ad-
ministrative agency for which there is no stat-
ute specifically creating a right to judicial re-
view. DeBry v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Ap-
peals, 764 P.2d 627 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Cited in Scientific Academy of Hair Design, 
Inc. v. Bowen, 738 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987); In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
CHAPTER 3 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3-1. 
78-3-2. 
78-3-3. 
78-3-4. 
78-3-6. 
Repealed. 
Repealed. 
Term of judges — Vacancy. 
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases 
to circuit court — Appeals. 
Terms — Minimum of once quar-
terly. 
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed. 
78-3-11.5. 
78-3-12. 
78-3-12.5. 
78-3-13. 
78-3-13.4. 
78-3-14. 
78-3-14.5. 
State District Court Administra-
tive System — Primary and sec-
ondary county locations. 
Repealed. 
Costs of system. 
Repealed. 
Counties joining court system — 
Procedure — Facilities — Sala-
ries. 
Repealed. 
Allocation of district court fees 
and fines. 
Section 
78-3-15, 78-3-16. Repealed. 
78-3-16.5. 
78-3-17. 
78-3-17.5. 
78-3-18. 
78-3-20. 
78-3-21. 
78-3-24. 
78-3-27. 
78-3-30. 
Fees for filing and other services 
or actions. 
Repealed. 
Application of savings accruing to 
counties. 
Judicial Administration Act — 
Short title. 
Definitions. 
Judicial Council — Creation — 
Members — Terms and election 
— Responsibilities — Reports. 
Court administrator — Powers, 
duties, and responsibilities. 
Annual judicial conference. 
Duties of the clerk of the district 
court. 
78-3-1. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 115, § 8 repeals tive April 
§ 78-3-1 as amended by Laws 1982, ch. 21, § 1 provisions, 
relating to the number of district judges, effec-
25, 1988. For present comparable 
see § 78-1-2.2. 
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ADDENDUM C 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN GENERAL 31A-21-303 
31A-21-303. Termination of insurance policies by insurers, 
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, in other statutes, or by 
rule under Subsection (l)(c), this section applies to all policies of insur-
ance other than life and disability insurance and annuities, if they are 
issued on forms which are subject to filing and approval under Subsection 
31A-21-201Q). 
(b) A policy may provide terms more favorable to insureds than this 
section requires. 
(c) The commissioner may by rule totally or partially exempt from this 
section classes of insurance policies in which the insureds do not need 
protection against arbitrary or unannounced termination. 
(d) The rights provided by this section are in addition to and do not 
prejudice any other rights the insureds may have at common law or under 
other statutes. 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(c), no insurance policy may be 
cancelled by the insurer prior to the expiration of the agreed term or one 
year from the effective date of the policy or renewal, whichever is less, 
except for failure to pay a premium when due or on grounds stated in the 
policy. As used in this subsection, "grounds" means: 
(i) material misrepresentation; 
(ii) substantial change in the risk assumed, unless the insurer 
should reasonably have foreseen the change or contemplated the risk 
when entering into the contract; 
(iii) substantial breaches of contractual duties, conditions, or war-
ranties; 
(iv) attainment of the age specified as the terminal age for cover-
age, in which case the insurer may cancel by notice under Subsection 
(2)(b), accompanied by a tender of proportional return of premium; or 
(v) in the case of automobile insurance, revocation or suspension of 
the driver's license of the named insured or any other person who 
customarily drives the car. 
(b) Not sooner than 30 days after the delivery or first class mailing of a 
written notice to the policyholder, the cancellation provided by Subsec-
tion (2)(a), except cancellation for nonpayment of premium, is effective. 
Cancellation for nonpayment of premium is effective no sooner than ten 
days after delivery or first class mailing. Notice of cancellation for non-
payment of premium shall include a statement of the reason for cancella-
tion. Subsection (6) applies to the notice required for other grounds of 
cancellation. 
(c) Subsections (2)(a) and (b) do not apply to any insurance contract 
that has not been previously renewed if the contract has been in effect 
less than 60 days when the notice of cancellation is mailed or delivered. 
No cancellation under this subsection is effective until at least (10) days 
after the delivery to the insured of a written notice of cancellation. If the 
notice is sent by first class mail, postage prepaid, to the insured at his last 
known address, delivery is considered accomplished after the passing, 
since the mailing date, of the mailing time specified in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Policy cancellations subject to this subsection are not 
subject to the procedures described in Subsection (6). 
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(3) A policy may be issued for a term longer than one year or for an indefi-
nite term, with a clause providing for cancellation by the insurer by giving 
notice as provided in Subsection (4)(b)(i) 30 days prior to any anniversary 
date. 
(4) (a) Subject to Subsections (2), (3), (4)(b), and (4)(c), a policyholder has a 
right to have the policy renewed, on the terms then being applied by the 
insurer to similar risks, for an additional period of time equivalent to the 
expiring term if the agreed term is one year or less, or for one year if the 
agreed term is longer than one year. 
(b) The right to renewal under Subsection (4)(a) is extinguished if: 
(i) at least 30 days prior to the policy expiration or anniversary 
date a notice of intention not to renew the policy beyond the agreed 
expiration or anniversary date is delivered or sent by first class mail 
by the insurer to the policyholder at the policyholder's last known 
address; 
(ii) not more than 45 nor less than 14 days prior to the due date of 
the renewal premium, the insurer delivers or sends by first class mail 
a notice to the policyholder at the policyholder's last known address, 
clearly stating the renewal premium, how it may be paid, and that 
failure to pay the renewal premium by the due date extinguishes the 
policyholder's right to renewal; 
(iii) the policyholder has accepted replacement coverage, or has 
requested or agreed to nonrenewal; or 
(iv) the policy is expressly designated as nonrenewable. 
(5) (a) Subject to Subsection (5)(b), if the insurer offers or purports to renew 
the policy, but on less favorable terms or at higher rates, the new terms or 
rates take effect on the renewal date if the insurer delivered or sent by 
first class mail to the policyholder notice of the new terms or rates at least 
30 days prior to the expiration date of the prior policy. If the insurer did 
not give this prior notification to the policyholder, the new terms or rates 
do not take effect until 30 days after the notice is delivered or sent by first 
class mail, in which case the policyholder may elect to cancel the renewal 
policy at any time during the 30-day period. Return premiums or addi-
tional premium charges shall be calculated proportionately on the basis 
that the old rates apply. 
(b) Subsection (5)(a) does not apply if the only change in terms that is 
adverse to the policyholder is a rate increase generally applicable to the 
class of business to which the policy belongs, a rate increase resulting 
from a classification change based on the altered nature or extent of the 
risk insured against, or a policy form change made to make the form 
consistent with Utah law. 
(6) If a notice of cancellation or nonrenewal under Subsection (2Kb) does 
not state with reasonable precision the facts on which the insurer's decision is 
based, the insurer shall send by first class mail or deliver that information 
within ten working days after receipt of a written request by the policyholder. 
This notice is not effective unless it contains information about the policy-
holder's right to make the request. 
(7) If a risk-sharing plan under Section 31A-2-214 exists for the kind of 
coverage provided by the insurance being cancelled or nonrenewed, no notice 
of cancellation or nonrenewal required under Subsection (2)(b) or (4)(b)(i) is 
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effective unless it contains instructions to the policyholder for applying for 
insurance through the available risk-sharing plan. 
(8) There is no liability on the part of, and no cause of action against, any 
insurer, its authorized representatives, agents, employees, or any other per-
son furnishing to the insurer information relating to the reasons for cancella-
tion or nonrenewal or for any statement made or information given by them 
in complying or enabling the insurer to comply with this section unless actual 
malice is proved by clear and convincing evidence. 
(9) This section does not alter any common law right of contract rescission 
for material misrepresentation. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-21-303, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 26; 1986, ch. 204, § 144; 
1987, ch. 91, § 47; 1987, ch. 95, § 26. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, by Chapter 91, made a minor change in 
phraseology in Subsection (7). 
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 95, effec-
tive March 16, 1987, substituted "30" for "20" 
in the first sentence of Subsection (2Kb). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Compiler's Notes. — Although referred to 
in Subsection (4)(a), as enacted and amended, 
this section contains no Subsection (4)(c). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Renewal. 
—Nonpayment. 
As a matter of law, an insurer did not waive 
its right to refuse a late renewal payment and 
deny coverage, by its conduct in previously ac-
cepting a late installment payment. Clarke v. 
American Concept Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 470 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Cancellation of compulsory or "fi-
nancial responsibility" automobile insurance, 
44 A.L.R.4th 13. 
Fidelity bond termination clause on taking 
over of insured by another business entity: con-
struction and effect, 44 A.L.R.4th 1195. 
Validity and construction of automobile in-
surance provision or statute automatically ter-
minating coverage when insured obtains an-
other policy providing similar coverage, 61 
A.L.R.4th 1130. 
31A-21-304. Special cancellation provisions. 
Whether or not Section 31A-21-303 is also applicable: 
(1) Section 31A-21-305 applies to cancellation on request of a premium 
finance company; 
(2) Section 70C-6-304 applies to cancellation upon request of a creditor; 
and 
(3) Sections 41-12a-404 and 41-12a-405 apply to the cancellation or 
other termination of insurance coverage or of a surety bond after the 
insurer or surety has provided a certificate of insurance or suretyship to 
the Department of Public Safety. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-21-304, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 26; 1986, ch. 204, § 145; 
1987, ch. 91, § 48. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, in Subsection (2), substituted "70C-6-
304" for "70B-4-304." 
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70C-6-303 CONSUMER CREDIT CODE 
70C-6-303. Liability insurance. 
A creditor may not contract for or receive a separate charge for insurance 
against liability arising out of the ownership or use of property related to the 
credit transaction, unless the insurance covers a significant risk of liability. 
History: C. 1953, 70C-6-303, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 159, § 8. 
70C-6-304. Cancellation by creditor. 
A creditor may not request cancellation of a policy of property or liability 
insurance except after the debtor's default or in accordance with a written 
authorization by the debtor, and in either case the cancellation does not take 
effect until written notice is delivered to the debtor or mailed to him at his 
address as stated by him. The notice shall state that the policy may be can-
celled on a date not less than ten days after the notice is delivered, or, if the 
notice is mailed, not less than 13 days after it is mailed. 
History: C. 1953, 70C-6-304, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 159, § 8. 
CHAPTER 7 
REMEDIES AND PENALTIES 
Part 
1. Limitation on Creditors' Remedies. 
2. Debtors' Remedies. 
PART 1 
LIMITATION ON CREDITORS' REMEDIES 
Section Section 
70C-7-101. Restriction on deficiency judg- 70C-7-105. Extortionate extensions of credit. 
ments in consumer credit sales. 70C-7-106. Unconscionabihty. 
70C-7-102. No garnishment before judgment. 70C-7-107. Notice of negative credit report 
70C-7-103. Definitions — Limitation on gar- required. 
nishment. 
70C-7-104. No discharge from employment 
for garnishment. 
70C-7-101. Restriction on deficiency judgments in con-
sumer credit sales. 
(1) If a seller repossesses or voluntarily accepts the surrender or return of 
goods which were the subject of a consumer credit sale and in which the seller 
has a security interest to secure a debt arising from the sale of goods or 
services or a combined sale of goods and services, and the cash price of the sale 
was $3,000 or less, any debt remaining from the sale shall be fully satisfied 
and the seller has no further obligation to the buyer with respect to the goods 
taken or accepted. 
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